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Case No. 20010949-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to die provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVD2W 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain die jury's verdicts diat Smitii 
committed communications fraud? This Court will reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable mat reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." State 
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
This issue was preserved in a motion to dismiss made during trial (R. 931: 265-
69). 
1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all controlling statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
David Smith appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fifth 
District Court after being convicted by a jury of securities fraud, a felony, and 
communications fraud a second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
David Smith was charged by information filed in Fifth District Court on or about 
July 12, with the following criminal violations: Securities Fraud, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §§61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2)(b); Transacting Business Without a License, 
a third degree felony, in violation of § 61-1-3(1) and § 61-1-21(1); Sale of an 
Unregistered Security, a third degree felony, in violation of §§ 61-1-7 and 61-1-21(1); 
Employing an Unregistered Agent, a third degree felony, in violation of §§ 61-l-3(2)(a) 
and 61-1-21(1); Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-
10-1801; Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-10-1801; 
Theft by Deception, a second degree felony, in violation of §§ 76-6-405 and 76-6-
12(l)(a)(i); Money Laundering, a second degree felony, in violation of §§ 76-10-1903 
and 76-10-1904; and Money Laundering, a second degree felony, in violation of §§ 76-
10-1903 and 76-10-1904 (R. 1-3). 
On August 7, 1996, the State filed an amended information that reduced Smith's 
charges to: Count I - Securities Fraud, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-1 
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and 61-l-21(2)(b); Count II - Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in 
violation of § 76-10-1801; Count III - Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, 
in violation of § 76-10-1801; Count IV - Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
§§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-12(l)(a)(i); Count V - Money Laundering, a second degree 
felony, in violation of §§ 76-10-1903 and 76-10-1904; and Count VI - Money 
Laundering, a second degree felony, in violation of §§ 76-10-1903 and 76-10-1904 (R. 
22-24). 
On October 3 and December 9, 1996, a preliminary hearing was held in regards 
to co-defendants Katherine Karol and Lee Walker (R. 32-33, 57, 951). 
On February 25, 1997, a preliminary hearing was held in regards to the charges 
against Smith (R. 62-65, 953). At the close of the hearing Judge Rand Beacham took 
the matter under advisement (R. 65, 953 at 225). On April 9 and 21, 1997, Judge 
Beacham issued orders binding Smith over for trial on Count I - Securities Fraud, a 
felony, and Count III - Communications Fraud, a second degree felony (R. 76-77, 81-
82). 
On May 28, 1997, counsel for Smith filed a Motion to Quash Bind Over Order 
(R. 83). Smith argued that the lead investigator, Joe Murray committed perjury while 
testifying before the magistrate at the preliminary hearings (R. 83). Murray, an 
investigator with the Nevada Secretary of State, Securities Division in Las Vegas, 
testified that on May 31, 1995, he along with investigator Michael Lee and Deputy 
Attorney General Grenville Pridham, interviewed Smith and tape recorded the 
interview (R. 83-4). At the preliminary hearing, the court asked Murray "have you 
read this transcript and reviewed the tape recording?" (R. 84). Murray testified "I 
made sure that this was the actual accurate transcription of this particular tape that we 
3 
put on for the interview of David Smith" (R. 84). Page 1 of the transcript was 
admitted into evidence which stated: 
O.K like I was telling you Mr. Murray, he gave us One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000) because he's such a nice guy. And now he's trying to extort 
$100,000 from me. Can you believe that? Now, I was telling, the way the 
program goes, is that I get somebody that is stupid enough to give me $100,000 
and then I tell them that I'm going to pay them back four times their initial 
investment. You got to admit, anybody that stupid deserves to lose their money. 
Don't you agree Mr. Murray? 
(R. 84). This was not the voice of Smith (R. 84). The State agreed that the voice was 
not that of Smith, but the letters the State sent to the Magistrate were not included in 
the record of the preliminary hearing (R. 84-5). Smith also stated in this motion that 
Murray introduced or commented on the following exhibits entered as evidence against 
Smith: #'s 3-10 and # 13 (R. 86). Smith argued that he would have questioned every 
piece of testimony brought out through Murray, including the above listed exhibits (R. 
86). Smith farther argues that the State "failed to introduce a shred of evidence at the 
preliminary hearing that would indicate Smith knew that any security, i.e. the 
Memorandum of Understanding" between Sorenson and Summa existed (R. 89). 
Sorenson stated that he did not remember Smith making any mention of the 
Memorandum of Understanding that was introduced into evidence as exhibit one or two 
(R. 86). Also, the second phone call that Sorenson had with Smith occurred in the 
spring or early summer of 1995 (R. 87). Smith further argues that there was no 
evidence put forward to show that any representations made by Smith were fraudulent 
(R. 90). 
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On May 27, 1997, Smith's counsel filed an Affidavit of Expert that showed that 
the voice in the tape-recorded conversation between Murray and Smith was not Smith's 
voice (R. 93-7). 
On June 2, 1997, Smith' counsel filed an Amended Motion to Quash the Bind 
Over Order (R. 100-8). The Amended Motion included testimony from an expert that 
believed the voice attributed to Smith in the tape-recorded interview was actually that of 
Grenville Pridham, Assistant Attorney General, State of Nevada (R. 102). Smith also 
stated that Pridham has "personal ill will, hate, or malice towards David B. Smith" 
citing a previous meeting (R. 102-3). Smith also argued that the State failed to 
introduce a shred of evidence that would indicate that Smith knew that any security 
existed (R. 107). 
On June 17, 1997, prosecution witness Joseph Murray filed his affidavit with the 
court, stipulating that the voice on the tape that purported to be that of Smith was in 
fact the voice of Grenville Pridham, but Murray did not know how the voice got there 
(R. 127-9). On June 17, 1997, the State filed its Points and Authorities In Opposition 
To Motion To Quash and Motion To Reconsider (R. 130). 
On June 27, 1997, counsel for Smith filed Defendant's Response To State's 
Points And Authorities In Opposition To Motion To Quash (R. 146). In part Smith 
argued that Murray's perjured testimony and the admitted false evidence against Smith 
requires a new probable cause determination (R. 150-1). 
On July 2, 1997, Smith filed Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to State's 
Motion to Reconsider (R. 153-59). Smith argued that the district court did not have 
power to order him to answer a charge on which the magistrate did not bind him over 
(R. 153). 
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On November 13, 1997, Judge Beacham issued a written ruling denying Smith's 
motion to quash and the State's motion to reconsider (R. 169-172). Following Judge 
Beacham's order, Smith filed with this Court a petition for permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal which was denied (Case No. 970701-CA) (R. 176). 
On April 9, 1998, Smith filed Defendant's Motion for Waiver of Arraignment 
Hearing and entered a plea of not guilty (R. 193-94, 195). The waiver was granted on 
April 9, 1998 (R. 200). 
On April 23, 1998, Douglas Terry entered his appearance as counsel for Smith 
(R. 203). 
On February 2, 1999, the State gave Notice of Intent to Call Expert Witnesses 
and Designation of Law Witnesses (R. 212-15). 
On April 15, 1999, David Pleasanton, counsel for Smith, filed a Motion to 
Withdraw as Smith's counsel (R. 221-22). On June 3, 1999, the Motion to Withdraw 
was granted (R. 275). 
On August 16, 1999, the district court ordered David Pleasanton to turn over all 
file materials and documents regarding this case to Smith (R. 292-93). 
On November 5, 1999, Douglas Terry filed his Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 
(R. 509). On November 10, 1999, the district court again ordered David Pleasanton to 
turn over all files regarding this case (R. 511-13). 
On March 28, 2000, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Call Expert Witnesses, 
namely S. Anthony Taggert and Kelly R. Johnson (R. 535). 
On April 17, 2000, Smith's counsel, Clella Blakely, filed a Motion to Continue 
the Jury Trial (R. 546). The motion was granted (R. 592). 
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On June 30, 2000, the Honorable Judge Rand Beacham entered a voluntary 
recusal, good cause appearing, and it was ordered that the Honorable Judge Anthony 
W. Schofield would preside (R. 608). 
On January 18, 2001, Clella Blakely was allowed to withdraw as counsel for 
Smith (R. 630). Brian Harris was appointed as counsel for Smith on February 1, 2001 
(R. 633). On May 14, 2001, co-counsel was appointed for Smith (R. 660). 
On June 18, 2001, the State filed a second amended information which charged 
Smith with: Count I - Securities Fraud, a felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§§61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2)(b); and Count II - Communications Fraud, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801 (R. 691-92). 
On June 18, 2001, Smith filed a Motion In Limine, requesting the court not to 
allow testimony from witnesses which would provide a legal conclusion (R. 712-115). 
On June 18-20, 2001, a jury trial was held with Judge Anthony W. Scofield 
presiding (R. 729-35, 930-32). After a deliberation of approximately two hours, the 
jury found Smith guilty on on both counts (R. 735, 787). 
On October 5, 2001, Smith filed pro se a Motion for a New Trial, claiming he 
did not receive a fair trial (R. 832). 
On November 9, 2001, Smith was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
more than ten years in the Utah State Prison based on his conviction for Securities 
Fraud. Smith was also sentenced to a concurrent indeterminate of not less than one 
year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison based on his conviction based 
on his conviction for Communications Fraud. The prison terms were suspended and 
Smith was placed on probation for 36 months. Included in the terms and conditions of 
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probation were that Smith serve 90 days in jail and that he pay restitution in the amount 
of $50,000 (R. 883-85). 
On November 28, 2001, Smith, through his counsel Brian Harris, filed Notice of 
Appeal to his sentence for the conviction of Communications Fraud and Securities 
Fraud (R. 888-89). 
On March 7, 2002, the district court denied Smith's Motion for New Trial (R. 
937). On April 3, 2002, the district court denied Smith's motion to arrest judgment 
and motion for a new trial (R. 939-40). 
On May 3, 2002, Smith filed Notice of Appeal taken from the entire judgment 
after a jury trial (R. 941). 
The appeals were consolidated by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of David Smith 
David Smith testified that he resides in Jupiter, Florida (R. 931: 274). Smith 
testified that he had never been in Utah before this case (R. 931: 276). 
Smith testified that he had a business acquaintance with David Walker, an 
attorney in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 1993 (R. 931: 277-8). Smith testified that in 
October of 1994, Walker and another individual, possibly Lance Hatch, called Smith 
and asked him if he knew Louis B. Santi and a supposed deal that Santi had with Bear 
Stearns (R. 931: 278). Smith told Walker that "I don't know anything about that," but 
Walker asked Smith if he could find out about the business transaction (R. 931: 278). 
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Smith testified that he called Santi and asked about the business arrangement 
with Bear Stearns on Walker's behalf (R. 931: 279). Smith testified that he learned 
from Santi that a Walid Z. Summa was involved in the transaction (R. 931: 281). 
After learning about the transaction, Smith called Walker back and told him about "the 
people that were involved in the transaction, the terms and circumstances of the 
transaction, and beyond that, I didn't want to know any more" (R. 931: 282). Smith 
also testified that he told Walker about Walid Summa and said specifically "I will not 
do business with or touch Walid Summa" (R. 931: 282). Smith testified that he had 
previous dealings with Summa and did not trust the man (R. 931: 281). 
Smith testified that after he told Walker this information, Walker called him 
back that same day with two people on the line (R. 931: 281). Smith testified that he 
believed that the two people were Hatch and Marc Sorenson (R. 931: 284). Smith 
testified that the first thing he was asked about was "okay, David let's hear the sales 
pitch" (R. 931: 284). Smith testified that he responded saying, "I'm not trying to sell 
you a f-ing [sic] thing, sir" (R. 931: 284). Smith testified that he was asked about the 
transaction and to explain it (R. 931: 284). Smith testified that he first asked Sorenson 
about his investment history (R. 931: 284). Smith testified that Sorenson responded 
that he had dealt with Merrill Lynch (R. 931: 285). Smith testified that he then told 
them: 
All I can tell you is the players are Bear Stearns Mercantile represented by an 
attorney by the name of Xavier Fazzio. . . . Mercantile is an offshore company 
of Bear Stearns. They have an agreement with Walid Summa. And sir, on the 
basis I know Mr. Summa as head to wire, and counsel has proof that he wanted 
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$15,000 for his sub-account, these are the players. I don't know any more of 
the specifics of it. I suggest you call your brokerage people. . . . 
(R. 931:285). 
Smith testified that Sorenson was the only one that responded and asked about 
Bear Stearns (R. 931: 286). Smith testified that he told Sorenson "I suggest you ask 
that question of Merrill Lynch, because they are in a similar type of business" (R. 931: 
285). Smith testified that Walker also asked a few questions about communicating with 
these people and Smith told him to communicate with them directly (R. 931: 286). 
Smith testified that there was nothing further mentioned in the conversation (R. 931: 
286). Smith also testified that he did not communicate with Sorenson prior to learning 
that money had been deposited into his bank account (R. 931: 288). 
Smith testified that a few days later, Walker called him explaining that Sorenson 
wished to proceed and where should Sorenson send the money (R. 931: 288). Smith 
testified that he told Walker to comply with the laws of solicitation and not send the 
money anywhere without something in writing from the people who were doing the 
investment (R. 931: 289). Smith testified that he never discussed with Walker about 
depositing money into Smith's bank account (R. 931: 289). 
Smith testified that Summa owed him $760,000 for prior services (R. 931: 290, 
304). Smith testified that Santi called him and that Summa was going to pay the debt 
by depositing money into Smith's bank account in "two or three" deposits (R. 931: 
290, 293). Smith testified that at that time, he did not have a good income stream (R. 
931: 293). Smith testified that $50,000 was transferred into his bank account via a 
wire transfer, but thought that it was money that Summa owed him (R. 931: 292-4, 
307). Smith further testified that "I certainly would not have taken it had I known at 
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the time that this money came from Utah. I didn't know anyone in Utah" (R. 931: 
307). Six days after Smith received the initial deposit that he believed came from 
Summa, $250,000 more was deposited in his bank account (R. 931: 306). 
Smith further testified that he had never seen either of the two Memorandums of 
Understanding and that he had nothing to do with them (R. 931: 294). Smith testified 
that Santi had his bank coordinates from prior business dealings and that Santi had 
wired money to Smith's bank account on "two or three other occasions" (R. 931: 295). 
Smith testified that he did not know that anything was wrong with the money he 
received in his account until Santi and Walker called him (R. 931: 296). Smith testified 
that they asked him about the transaction and when it was going to occur, but Smith 
responded, "you signed the agreement with these people, why are you calling me?" (R. 
931:296). 
Smith also testified that Sorenson called him about nine months after the first 
phone call, and that Sorenson wanted to know when he was going to receive the money 
(R. 931: 298-9). Smith told Sorenson that he should call the people that he signed the 
agreement with (R. 931: 299). Smith testified that after he learned the facts that he had 
actually received part of Sorenson's money, he felt he had a moral obligation to repay 
him (R. 931: 300). Smith testified that when he learned that the money came form 
Utah, the money was already spent and he had laid out $390,000 for legal fees to 
defend himself against the charges (R. 391: 307-8). 
B. Testimony of Marc Sorenson 
Marc Sorenson testified that on October 13, 1994, his friend, Lance Hatch, 
informed him of a particular investment involving Lee Walker (R. 930: 95, 117, 119). 
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Lee Walker was an attorney from Las Vegas, Nevada, and a friend of Lance Hatch. 
(R. 930: 97). Sorenson testified that Hatch told him that there was a great deal of 
money to be made (R. 930: 118). As Sorenson and Hatch talked more about the 
investment, Sorenson testified, "I asked him if I might be able to get involved in it" (R. 
930: 95). Sorenson testified that Hatch told him the very rudiments of the deal, but not 
in great detail (R. 930: 121). 
That same night, at Sorenson's urging, they called Walker and David Smith 
about the investment (R. 930: 96). Walker was called first, then Smith (R. 930: 143). 
Sorenson stated that both Walker and Smith told him about the investment (R. 930: 97). 
Sorenson testified that it was his understanding that Smith was running the investment 
(R. 930: 98). 
Sorenson testified: 
Smith told me there was a gentleman named Walid Summa, who was a 
billionaire, who had a billion dollars that he needed to get from somewhere, 
some foreign country into the United States of America. And in order to get 
this, he could not - - he could not do it unless there was a bank account set up. 
That bank account was going to be an account separate from him. It was going 
to be a half million dollars. It had to be a half million dollars. And once this 
account was set up, then they could move the money from wherever it was to the 
United States through this account. And that there was to be a 15 percent 
commission on this one billion dollars, which was to be given to the people who 
had set up the account 
(R. 390: 98-99). 
Sorenson further testified that Smith told him that the account was to go through 
Bear Stearns (R. 930: 99). Sorenson also stated that Smith informed him that the 
investment was close to a sure thing (R. 930: 101). Sorenson testified that Smith used 
a few swear words during the conversation (R. 930: 124). 
Sorenson testified that he could not recall if Smith expounded on what made the 
investment so safe (R. 930: 101). Sorenson testified that Smith never stated that he 
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would receive any commission from the investment, nor did Smith state whether or not 
he had a securities license (R. 930: 102). Sorenson never stated that Smith said he was 
running the investment, that he would receive any commission, or that Smith offered to 
sell the investment (R. 930: 100-2). Nor did Sorenson ever state that Smith knew that 
the money was to go to first into Walker's trust account and then be transferred to 
Smith (R. 930: 102). 
Sorenson testified that he signed the Memorandum of Understanding, State's 
Exhibit #1 (R. 930: 105). Sorenson received the first memo from Hatch and signed the 
memorandum at Hatch's home (R. 930: 106, 146). This memo states it was signed 
October 15, 1995, but Sorenson believes the date of 1995 is incorrect and that it should 
be 1994 (R. 930: 108). Sorenson testified that he did not know how Hatch obtained the 
memorandum (R. 930: 106). 
For the second Memorandum of Understanding, State's Exhibit #2, Sorenson 
testified that he did not remember signing a second document, although his signature 
was on it (R. 930: 107, 147-8). The second memorandum is dated October 17, 1994 
(R. 930: 108). Sorenson was unsure who he received the second memo from, but said 
"I think from Lance Hatch" (R. 930: 146). Sorenson also testified that he did not 
know how the different terms on the second memorandum got typed on it (R. 930: 
107). The first memo states that all of the $100,000 goes to the Bear Stearns account 
(R. 930: 109). The second memo changes this and says that half goes in the Bear 
Stearns account and half goes to Smith (R. 930: 109). Sorenson testified that he 
remembered reading one of the memos, but is not sure which one (R. 930: 152). 
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Sorenson testified that he did not recall Smith mentioning "world prime bank" at 
any time (R. 930: 169). Sorenson said that he did not know what the term meant and it 
did not affect his decision to invest (R. 930: 170). 
Sorenson testified that only one phone call was made to Smith before he sent the 
money to Walker (R. 930: 125). Sorenson testified that this phone call lasted "not 
more than 10 minutes" (R. 930: 140). Sorenson further testified that he and Hatch 
decided the money would go to Walker after the phone call was made to Smith (R. 930: 
126). Sorenson stated, Lance Hatch and myself "did not actually decided where the 
money was going to go until a little bit later" (R. 930: 126). Sorenson testified that 
Hatch told him the money was supposed to go to Smith (R. 930: 126). Sorenson also 
testified that Hatch told him that Smith would be running the investment part of the deal 
(R. 930: 13). Sorenson could not recall whether or not he told Smith that he was going 
to invest $100,000 (R. 930: 127-8). Sorenson further testified that he could not ever 
recall Smith instructing him about sending money anywhere (R. 930: 167). Sorenson 
could not remember ever having a conversation with Smith about specifically investing 
$100,000 (R. 930: 127-28). Sorenson could not remember whether Smith or Walker 
discussed the 15% commission (R. 930: 150). 
Sorenson testified that he had never employed a brokerage firm previous to this 
transaction (R. 930: 133). Sorenson testified that Smith never told him to employ a 
brokerage firm in this transaction or to check out Summa (R. 930: 133-4). 
Sorenson testified that he sent $100,000 to Walker into a trust account (R. 930: 
102). Sorenson testified that he assumed that all of the $100,000 would be invested (R. 
930: 102). After not receiving any money back after a few months, Sorenson testified 
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that he spoke with Hatch and Hatch "tried to get in touch with various people" and then 
told him that he should call Smith (R. 930: 172-3). 
Sorenson testified that he called Smith about six times (R. 930: 103-4, 174). 
Sorenson testified that he actually spoke with Smith at these times (R. 930: 174). 
Sorenson alleges that during one of the phone calls, Smith told him that "he had this 
money or some other money that he was going to get back to me" (R. 930: 104). 
Sorenson also testified that Smith told him "the money was imminent, that it was going 
to be back. He was working on a deal to get the money back" (R. 930: 174). 
Sorenson testified that he last spoke with Smith just after he filed his complaint with the 
securities commission in Nevada (R. 930: 103-4). Sorenson testified that after he filed 
the grievance with the state of Nevada, Smith called him and said that he should be 
suing Sorenson (R. 930: 104). 
On the grievance filed with Nevada, Sorenson wrote down that he first learned 
of the investment through Hatch (R. 930: 139). Sorenson also wrote that Walker was 
the person that made the offer or sale (R. 930: 138-9). Sorenson further testified that 
he did not know whether it was Walker or Smith that told him that these deals happen 
often and are legitimate (R. 141). Sorenson also wrote on the grievance form "Lee 
Walker said that David Smith was the person who orchestrated the deal" (R. 930: 142). 
Sorenson further wrote on the complaint that the principle reason he transferred his 
money was "my friend, Lance Hatch, told me he had known Lee Walker for many 
years and that Lee was honest" (R. 930: 143). 
C. Testimony of Kelly Ray Johnson 
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Kelly Ray Johnson testified that he specializes in forensic accounting and is a 
certified public accountant employed by a firm in Salt Lake City (R. 930: 156). 
Johnson testified regarding the $100,000 that Sorenson transferred to Walker's trust 
account (R. 930: 161). 
Johnson testified that on October 18, 1994, $100,000 was transferred from 
Sorenson9 s bank account to a bank account controlled by Walker (R. 930: 161). On the 
same day, $50,000 from Walker's account was transferred to Bear Stearns Company, 
and the remaining $50,000 was transferred to Smith's joint account with his wife (R. 
930: 162). Previous to this transfer, Smith balance was zero (R. 930: 162). On 
October 19, 1994, Smith began using the money for personal purchases and expenses 
(R. 930: 163-4). Johnson testified that he found that Smith did not attempt to invest the 
money (R. 930: 164-5). 
D. Testimony of Herbert Biern 
Herbert Biern testified that he is a senior official at the Federal Reserve Board in 
Washington D.C. (R. 931: 208-9). He supervises some banking organizations in the 
United States (R. 931: 209). Biern testified that the Federal Reserve supervises certain 
banking organization in this country and the U.S. activities of foreign banks in the 
country (R. 931:210). 
Biern testified that a "prime bank instrument" does not exist (R. 931: 212). 
Biern testified that the term is not legitimately used in banking (R. 931: 213). Biern 
testified that there are certain "hallmarks" or characteristics that identify a "prime bank 
instrument" (R. 931: 213). The first is the use of "prime bank instrument" itself (R. 
931: 213). Others are a promise of a very unrealistic rate of return, "somehow made 
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by trading, buying and selling, flipping things over and over again" (R. 931: 214). 
Biern testified that another characteristic is that the documents are overly complex and 
do not make any sense (R: 931: 214). Also, references are made to buying and selling 
legitimate financial instruments such as letters of credit and bank guarantees (R. 931: 
214). Biern testified that these bank guarantees are contingent of liabilities and "you 
don't buy and sell liabilities" (R. 931: 214-5). Finally, the transaction takes place in a 
secret market, with references to the International Chamber of Commerce and that the 
transactions somehow support non-profit organizations such as humanitarian projects 
(R. 931:215-6). 
Biern reviewed Plaintiffs Exhibit #2, the second memorandum, and found that it 
contained the term "prime bank instrument" (R. 931: 217). The memorandum also 
stated "client agrees to pay to investor an amount equal to 3.75 times his investment" 
(R. 931: 218). Biern also found that the memorandum of understanding would follow 
the rules and regulations of the International Chamber of Commerce (R. 931: 219). 
Biern testified that the ICC does not issue rules or regulations, but he admitted 
that the ICC does issue suggested formats for transactions so that people from differing 
countries can conduct business with another country (R. 931: 219). 
Biern also testified that he had never seen a prime bank instrument that was 
legitimate (R. 931: 219). Biern testified that the Federal Reserve does not have 
authority over securities issues, but it has supervisory /regulatory authority over banking 
organizations in the United States (R. 931: 222). Biern testified that the Federal 
Reserve only regulates the U.S. activities of foreign banks and does not regulate 
banking transactions between foreign banks and individual customers of those banks (R. 
931: 223). 
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Biern testified that Euroclear is an organization that clears bonds in the 
international market (R. 931: 223). Although Biern stated "I'm not an expert on 
Euroclear," he testified that the European market does not buy and sell bank guarantees 
or letters of credit and Euroclear would not be involved in such investments (R. 931: 
224). 
Biern testified that he had no legal authority to investigate issues that involve 
institutions outside of the United States such as this case (R. 931: 230). Biern also 
testified that he had no knowledge or understanding of where the memorandums of 
understanding originated or who authored the two memos (R. 931: 236). Biern also 
testified that he did not know whether the two memorandums of understanding were 
used in any transaction (R. 931: 236). Biern further testified that he had no knowledge 
of how the documents applied in the case at bar (R. 931: 237). 
E. Testimony of Steven Anthony Taggart 
Steven Anthony Taggart testified that he is the Utah director of Division of 
Securities and has been there for nearly three years (R. 931: 238). Taggart stated that 
he has testified roughly 45 times before as an expert witness in security law cases (R. 
931: 239). Taggart also testified that he teaches continuing legal education on 
securities law (R. 931:239). 
Taggart testified that the "commonly accepted definition within the industry of 
an investment contract is when you have an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with the expectation of profit to be derived through the substantial efforts of 
a third person" (R. 931: 240). Taggart stated that this definition comes from S.E.C. v. 
Howie (R. 931:242). 
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Taggart testified that a common enterprise can be defined in two ways (R. 931: 
245). One, "look at the commonality among the investors, meaning you have to pool 
the money of various investors to come up with whatever you have" (R. 931: 245). 
Second, "the common enterprise could be vertical between the promoter or issuer and 
the investor" (R. 931: 245). 
Taggart defined a security as an "intangible product," and a security offered for 
sale must have "full disclosure" (R. 931: 246). Taggart testified that the necessary 
disclosure is what a "reasonable investor would find important in making an investment 
decision" (R. 931: 248). Such factors would be risk of losing your money, the 
description of the business such as financial information and background on the 
individuals that are operating the business and selling the investment, and how the 
money will be used (R. 931: 248-9). Taggart testified that securities must first be 
registered with the state to allow the state to review them (R. 931: 246). Taggart also 
testified that individuals engaged in selling securities must be licensed (R. 931: 246). 
Taggart also testified that an investment contract is considered to be a security in 
Utah (R. 931: 246). Taggart admitted that there are exceptions where an investment 
contract is not a security, such as commercial and consumer loans and similar 
transactions (R. 931: 254-5). 
Taggart testified that "an offer is simply defined as any attempt to dispose of a 
security for value" (R. 931: 259). Taggart testified that if a person receives an 
unsolicited phone call from a person wanting information concerning an investment 
contract, the person receiving the phone call has no liability if he has no connection 
with the investment even though information is dispersed regarding the investment 
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because "they would not be attempting to dispose of that security for value" (R. 931: 
260). 
Taggart testified that a person does not have to directly offer a security to be 
liable because the "criminal jurisdiction and the statute within the securities laws make 
aiders and abettors, controlled persons, agents, liable to the same extent as another 
individual that actually makes the offer or effects the sales" (R. 931: 262). Taggart 
further testified that a person must still have the necessary intent depending on the 
charge (R. 931: 263). Taggart finally testified that the hypothetical proposed by the 
prosecution regarding whether Smith was involved in offering or selling a security 
"apparently" depends upon a lot of things that were not before the court (R. 931: 263-
4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Smith asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he 
committed communications fraud and that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Accordingly, Smith asks that this Court reverse his 
convictions for communications fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S 
VERDICT THAT SMITH COMMITTED COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Smith was convicted by the jury of one count of communications fraud, a secon 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-1801. Smith asserts that 
the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that he 
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committed communication fraud; and that the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" 
that Smith committed this crime. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
This issue requires that Smith marshal the evidence "in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 611 (Utah 1996). Smith has 
previously marshaled the evidence relevant to these charges in his statement of facts, 
but also does so as necessary here. This issue was preserved in a motion to dismiss 
made during trial (R. 931: 265-69). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801, and Jury Instruction #28, set forth the 
elements of communication fraud: One, that Smith either "devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another" or "devised a scheme or artifice to obtain money by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises" or "devised a scheme or 
artifice to obtain from another money by means of material omissions." Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-1801(1) and Jury Instruction #28. Two, that Smith 
"communicatefd] directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose 
of either "executing the scheme or artifice" or "concealing the scheme or artifice." 
Id. Three, that Smith made "the pretenses, representations, promises or material 
omissions made or omitted" intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the 
truth. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801(7) and Jury Instruction #28. 
The State's theory of the communication charge was that after the security fraud 
occurred there were communications made between Sorenson and Smith that "lulled 
[Sorenson] along" and "delayfed] [him] finding out" that half of his money had been 
spent on personal things (R. 932: 341). Smith asserts that the evidence presented to the 
jury is insufficient to support this theory of communications fraud and insufficient to 
21 
establish all of the necessary elements of communications fraud as set forth in Jury 
Instruction #28. 
One, in order to convict Smith of communications fraud the State had to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith "devised a scheme or artifice" to either 
defraud, obtain money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, or by means of 
material omissions. Smith asserts that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he 
"devised" any such scheme or artifice: 
Sorenson testified that he learned of the investment opportunity with Lee Walker 
from his "friend", Lance Hatch (R. 930: 95, 117, 119). Sorenson testified that Hatch 
told him that there was a great deal of money to be made; and that after further 
discussion with Hatch, Sorenson asked if he could get involved (R. 930: 95, 118). 
Sorenson also testified that Hatch told him the rudiments of the deal (R. 930: 121). 
That same night, at Sorenson9s urging, they called Walker and David Smith about 
the investment (R. 930: 96). Walker was called first, then Smith (R. 930: 143). Sorenson 
stated that both Walker and Smith told him about the investment (R. 930: 97). Sorenson 
also testified: 
Smith told me there was a gentleman named Walid Summa, who was a billionaire, 
who had a billion dollars that he needed to get from somewhere, some foreign 
country into the United States of America. And in order to get this, he could not -
- he could not do it unless there was a bank account set up. That bank account was 
going to be an account separate from him. It was going to be a half million 
dollars. It had to be a half million dollars. And once this account was set up, then 
they could move the money from wherever it was to the United States through this 
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account. And that there was to be a 15 percent commission on this one billion 
dollars, which was to be given to the people who had set up the account 
(R. 390: 98-99). 
Sorenson further testified that Smith told him that the account was to go through 
Bear Stearns (R. 930: 99). Sorenson also stated that Smith informed him that the 
investment was close to a sure thing (R. 930: 101). Sorenson testified that he could not 
recall if Smith expounded on what made the investment so safe (R. 930: 101). Sorenson 
testified that Smith never stated that he would receive any commission from the 
investment, nor did Smith state whether or not he had a securities license (R. 930: 102). 
While Sorenson understood that Smith was running the investment, Smith never stated to 
him that he was running the investment, that he would receive any commission, or that 
Smith offered to sell the investment (R. 930: 98, 100-2). 
In fact, Sorenson testified that he learned from Hatch that there would be other 
investors (R. 930: 100). Moreover, Sorenson received the first memorandum of 
understanding (State's Exhibit #1) from Hatch and signed it at Hatch's house; and 
Sorenson testified that he did not know how Hatch obtained the memorandum (R. 930: 
105-06, 146). In regards to the second memorandum (State's Exhibit #2), Sorenson 
testified that he did not remember signing a second document, although his signature 
was on it (R. 930: 107, 147-8). The second memorandum is dated October 17, 1994 
(R. 930: 108). Sorenson was unsure who he received the second memo from, but said 
"I think from Lance Hatch" (R. 930: 146). Sorenson also testified that he did not 
know how the different terms on the second memorandum got typed on it (R. 930: 
107). The first memo states that all of the $100,000 goes to the Bear Stearns account 
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(R. 930: 109). The second memo changes this and says that half goes in the Bear 
Stearns account and half goes to Smith (R. 930: 109). 
Sorenson testified that only one phone call was made to Smith before he sent the 
money to Walker (R. 930: 125). Sorenson testified that this phone call lasted "not 
more than 10 minutes" (R. 930: 140). Sorenson further testified that he and Hatch 
decided the money would go to Walker after the phone call was made to Smith (R. 930: 
126). Sorenson stated, Lance Hatch and myself "did not actually decided where the 
money was going to go until a little bit later" (R. 930: 126). Sorenson testified that 
Hatch told him the money was supposed to go to Smith (R. 930: 126). Sorenson also 
testified that Hatch told him that Smith would be running the investment part of the deal 
(R. 930: 13). Sorenson could not recall whether or not he told Smith that he was going 
to invest $100,000 (R. 930: 127-8). Sorenson further testified that he could not ever 
recall Smith instructing him about sending money anywhere (R. 930: 167). Sorenson 
could not remember ever having a conversation with Smith about specifically investing 
$100,000 (R. 930: 127-28). Sorenson could not remember whether Smith or Walker 
discussed the 15% commission (R. 930: 150). Sorenson testified that he sent $100,000 
to Walker into a trust account (R. 930: 102). Sorenson testified that he assumed that all 
of the $100,000 would be invested (R. 930: 102). 
A few days after his conversation with Hatch, Walker and Sorenson, Smith 
testified that Walker called him explaining that Sorenson wished to proceed and where 
should Sorenson send the money (R. 931: 288). Smith testified that he told Walker to 
comply with the laws of solicitation and not send the money anywhere without something 
in writing from the people who were doing the investment (R. 931: 289). Smith testified 
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that he never discussed with Walker about depositing money into Smith's bank account 
(R. 931: 289). 
Smith testified that Walid Summa owed him $760,000 for prior services (R. 931: 
290, 304). Smith testified that Louis Santi called him and indicated that Summa was 
going to pay the debt by depositing money into Smith's bank account in "two or three" 
deposits (R. 931: 290, 293). Smith testified that at that time, he did not have a good 
income stream (R. 931: 293). Smith testified that $50,000 was transferred into his bank 
account via a wire transfer, but thought that it was money that Summa owed him (R. 931: 
292-4, 307). Smith further testified that "I certainly would not have taken it had I known 
at the time that this money came from Utah. I didn't know anyone in Utah" (R. 931: 
307). Six days after Smith received the initial deposit that he believed came from 
Summa, $250,000 more was deposited in his bank account (R. 931: 306). 
Smith further testified that he had never seen either of the two Memorandums of 
Understanding and that he had nothing to do with them (R. 931: 294). Smith testified 
that Santi had his bank coordinates from prior business dealings and that Santi had wired 
money to Smith's bank account on "two or three other occasions" (R. 931: 295). 
Smith asserts that this evidence is insufficient to establish that he devised the 
fraudulent scheme or artifice; and that knowledge of a plan is not sufficient to establish 
the first element of communications fraud nor is the hearsay statements by Hatch 
sufficient to establish that Smith was the one who devised this scheme. 
Two, the second element that the State was required to establish to get a 
conviction of communications fraud was that Smith " communicate [d] directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose o f either "executing the 
scheme or artifice" or "concealing the scheme or artifice." Utah Code Annotated § 76-
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10-1801(1) and Jury Instruction #28. Smith asserts that the evidence presented at trial 
is also insufficient to establish this element of the crime. 
Sorenson testified that after the investment he spoke with Smith about six times 
(R. 930: 103-04, 174). Sorenson testified that Smith told him that "he had this money 
or some other money that he was going to get back to me" (R. 930: 104). Sorenson also 
testified that Smith told him "the money was imminent, that it was going to be back. He 
was working on a deal to get the money back" (R. 930: 174). Sorenson testified that he 
last spoke with Smith just after he filed his complaint with the securities commission in 
Nevada (R. 930: 103-4). Sorenson testified that after he filed the grievance with the state 
of Nevada, Smith called him and said that he should be suing Sorenson (R. 930: 104). 
Smith testified that Sorenson called him about nine months after the first phone 
call, and that Sorenson wanted to know when he was going to receive the money (R. 931: 
298-9). Smith told Sorenson that he should call the people that he signed the agreement 
with (R. 931: 299). Smith testified that after he learned the facts that he had actually 
received part of Sorenson's money, he felt he had a moral obligation to repay him (R. 
931: 300). Smith testified that when he learned that the money came form Utah, the 
money was already spent and he had laid out $390,000 for legal fees to defend himself 
against the charges (R. 391: 307-8). 
Smith asserts that the evidence is insufficient to establish any direct or indirect 
comunication that was intentionally, knowingly or recklessly made with the purpose of 
either executing any scheme/artifice or concealing any scheme/artifice. In fact, the 
evidence only demonstrates the moral obligation to return Sorenson's money which 
Smith felt when he learned where the deposit actually originated. As such, Smith 
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asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish the second requisite element of 
communications fraud. 
Accordingly, as the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Smith 
committed the crime of communications fraud as set forth in Jury Instruction #28 and 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801, Smith requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction for communication fraud. Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. In addition, Smith 
asserts that double jeopardy precludes any remand to the trial court for a new trial on 
this charge. See State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 n.l (Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Smith asks that this Court reverse his convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of April, 2003. 
Margaret P^ Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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76-10-1607 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 402 
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in 
c iv i l proceeding. 
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state or 
a county in any criminal proceeding brought by this state or a 
county shall preclude the defendant from denying the essen-
tial allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding. 1981 
76-10-1608. Severabil i ty c lause. 
If any pa r t or application of the Utah Pat tern of Unlawful 
Activity Act is held invalid, the remainder of this part, or its 
application to other situations or persons, is not affected. 
1987 
76-10-1609. Prospect ive application. 
The amendments to the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act are prospective in nature and apply only to civil causes-of 
action accruing after the effective date of this act. However, 
crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act may 
comprise pa r t of a pat tern of unlawful activity if at least one of 
the criminal episodes comprising that pat tern occurs after the 
effective date of this act and the pattern otherwise meets the 
definition of pattern of unlawful activity as defined in Section 
76-10-1602. 1987 
PART 17 
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECENCY 
ACT [REPEALED] 
76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708. Repealed. 1988 
PART 18 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
76-10-1801. Communicat ions fraud — Elements — Pen-
alt ies. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
rAeans for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be ob-
tained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be ob-
tained is or exceeds $300 but is less t han $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the prop-
erty, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the 
scheme or artifice to defraud is other t han the obtaining of 
something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all 
Property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by 
the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
Provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary 
element of the offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
described in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person 
of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element 
of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of 
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described m 
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) 
means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to 
give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit 
information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not lim-
ited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, tele-
vision, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless 
the pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally 
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the t ruth . 1995 
PART 19 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CURRENCY 
TRANSACTION REPORTING 
76-10-1901. Short tit le. 
This part is known as the Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act. isgg 
76-10-1902. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Bank" means each agent, agency, or office in this 
state of any person doing business in any one of the 
following capacities: 
(a) a commercial bank or t rust company organized 
under the laws of this state or of the United States; 
(b) a private bank; 
(c) a savings and loan association or a building and 
loan association organized under the laws of this 
s tate or of the United States; 
(d) an insured institution as defined in Section 401 
of the National Housing Act; 
(e) a savings bank, industrial bank, or other thrift 
institution; 
(f) a credit union organized under the laws of this 
s tate or of the United States; or 
(g) any other organization chartered under Title 7, 
Financial Institutions, and subject to the supervisory 
authority set forth in that title. 
(2) "Conducts" includes initiating, concluding, or par-
ticipating in initiating or concluding a transaction. 
(3) (a) "Currency" means the coin and paper money of 
the United States or of any other country that is 
designated as legal tender, tha t circulates, and is 
customarily used and accepted as a medium of ex-
change in the country of issuance. 
(b) "Currency" includes United States silver cer-
tificates, United States notes, Federal Reserve notes, 
and foreign bank notes customarily used and ac-
cepted as a medium of exchange in a foreign country. 
(4) "Financial institution" means any agent, agency. 
branch, or office within this state of any person doing 
business, whether or not on a regular basis or as 
organized business concern, in one or more of the tol 
ing capacities: 
(a) a bank, except bank credit card systems; 
(b) a broker or dealer in securities;
 a 
(c) a currency dealer or exchanger, including 
person engaged in the business of check cashing; 
(d) an issuer, seller, or redeemer °*\ t r a Vg e n t 
checks or money orders, except as a s e ^ ? n Q Q o f 
exclusively who does not sell more than $15U, 
the instruments within any 30-day period; 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER ^ 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime of "communications fraud" as 
alleged in Counts one md two of the Information, you must find from the evidence all of the 
following elements of the crime: 
1. That the defendant did at least ONE of the following: 
a. Devised a scheme or artifice to defraud another; 
b. or, devised a scheme or artifice to obtain from another money by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises; 
c. or, devised a scheme or artifice to obtain from another money by means of 
material omissions 
2. AND, in addition to at least one of the foregoing, the defendant communicated, directly 
or indirectly, with someone, by any means, for one of the following purposes: 
a. executing the scheme or artifice; 
b. or, concealing the scheme or artifice; 
3. AND the pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
were made or omitted: 
a. intentionally; 
b* knowingly; or 
c. with a reckless regard for the truth. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every one of the elements of the 
crime of communications fraud, beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty find the 
defendant guilty as to Count two of the Amended Information. On the other hand if the 
evidence has failed to establish one or more of the elements of the offenses charged, it shall be 
your duty to find the defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count two of the Amended 
Information. You must consider each count of the infonnation separately: your verdict on any 
particular count or counts should not affect your consideration of the evidence on any 
remaining counts. 
